Differences to previous studies
Study
The democratic disconnect, 2016
DOI
10.1353/jod.2016.0049
Fig
Fig 1
Title
Essential to live in a country that is governed democratically, by age cohort
Original Interpretation
When asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 10 how essential it is for them to live in a democracy, 72 percent of those born before World War II check 10, the highest value. So do 55 percent of the same cohort in the Netherlands.
But, as Figure 1 shows, the millennial generation (those born since 1980) has grown much more indifferent. Only one in three Dutch millennials accords maximal importance to living in a democracy; in the United States, that number is slightly lower, around 30 percent.
Indicator
Importance of Democracy
Technique
cross-sectional,
age-diff=cohort
Operationalization
acceptance of scale point 10
Country
1. US, 2. EU
Our Assessment
Voeten demonstrated that the result is largely due to focus on the one scale point. In our analysis, we calculate average in which these dynamics are then less stark.
Study
The democratic disconnect, 2016
DOI
10.1353/jod.2016.0049
Fig
Fig 2
Title
Having a democratic Political System is a bad or very bad way to run this country
Original Interpretation
The decline in support for democracy is not just a story of the young being more critical than the old; it is, in the language of survey research, owed to a cohort effect rather than an “age” effect. Back in 1995, for example, only 16 percent of Americans born in the 1970s (then in their late teens or early twenties) believed that democracy was a bad political system for their country. Twenty years later, the number of antidemocrats in this same generational cohort had increased by around 4 percentage points, to 20 percent. The next cohort—comprising those born in the 1980s—is even more antidemocratic: In 2011, 24 percent of U.S. millennials (then in their late teens or early twenties) considered democracy to be a bad or very bad way of running the country. Although this trend was somewhat more moderate in Europe, it was nonetheless significant: In 2011, 13 percent of European youth (aged 16 to 24) expressed such a view, up from 8 percent among the same age group in the mid-1990s (see Figure 2).
Indicator
Regime Preferences: Democracy
Technique
two-wave comparison: 1995 & 2011
Operationalization
democracy bad or very bad
Country
1. US, 2. EU: Germany, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland, and the United Kingdom
Our Assessment
In our data, there was a period effect between 99 and 2008 that may partially account for the findings in Figure 2.
However, in our data the period effect occured only in: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech, Republic, Netherlands.
Examining the presence of period effects when only considering countries that were included in the Foa Mounk analysis:
declining period effect were found in the 2000s in: Netherlands
no period effects in 2000s in: Poland, Germany
very small effects in: Spain
not in our sample: Romania, UK
In general: these investigations shows that there is not a lot of overlap between the country sample underlying Figure 2 and the country sample underlying our study
Study
The democratic disconnect, 2016
DOI
10.1353/jod.2016.0049
Fig
Fig 3
Title
The widening Political Apathy Gap
Original Interpretation
In fact, in both Western Europe and North America, interest in politics has rapidly and markedly declined among the young. At the same time, it has either remained stable or even increased among older cohorts.
In 1990, both a majority of young Americans (those between the ages of 16 and 35) and a majority of older Americans (36 years and older) reported being fairly interested or very interested in politics—53 and 63 percent, respectively. By 2010, the share of young Americans professing an interest in politics had dropped by more than 12 percentage points and the share of older Americans had risen by 4 percentage points. As a result, the generation gap had widened from 10 percentage points to 26 percentage points.
Among European respondents, who on the whole report less interest in politics than do their American counterparts, this phenomenon is even starker: The gap between young and old more than tripled between 1990 and 2010, from 4 to 14 percentage points. This is attributable almost solely to a rapid loss of interest amongyoung respondents. Whereas the share of Europeans aged 36 or older who were interested in politics remained stable at 52 percent, among the young that figured dropped from 48 to 38 percent
Indicator
Political Interest
Technique
two-wave comparison: 1990 and 2010
Operationalization
farily or very interested
Country
1. US
2. EU: Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Sweden
Our Assessment
one partial explanation of discrepancies between Figure 3 and our study might lie in the complex S-shaped curves in the developmeht of political interest across generations that our study has revealed and that is not visible in the Foa Mounk analysis as they dichotmized generation membership/age-groups.
In addition, we observe a small uptick among the very young generations and the Foa Mounk data does not cover that because we use a more recent data source
Study
The democratic disconnect, 2016
DOI
10.1353/jod.2016.0049
Fig
Fig 4
Title
Support for autoritarianism by income in the US
Original Interpretation
In the United States, among all age cohorts, the share of citizens who believe that it would be better to have a “strong leader” who does not have to “bother with parliament and elections” has also risen over time: In 1995, 24 percent of respondents held this view; by 2011, that figure had increased to 32 percent. Meanwhile, the proportion of citizens who approve of “having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country” has grown from 36 to 49 percent. One reason for these changes is that whereas two decades ago affluent citizens were much more likely than people of lower income groups to defend democratic institutions, the wealthy are now moderately more likely than others to favor a strong leader who can ignore democratic institutions (see Figure 4 below).
Indicator
Regime Preferences: Strong Leader
Technique
broken down by respondent's income
development of acceptance of strong leader across four survey waves
Operationalization
sub-group mean
Country
US
Our Assessment
Figure 4 only concerns the US which is not included in our sample. As noted by Norris (2017), the signs of democratic deconsolidation that can be observed in the US do not occur at the same magnitude or not at all in other (European) countries. Yet, Europe is the focus of our analysis.
Findings for EU are not reported in this Figure by Foa/Mounk
Study
The Signs of Deconsolidation, 2017
DOI
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/02_28.1_Foa%20%26%20Mounk%20pp%205-15.pdf
Fig
Fig 1
Title
Across the globe, the young are less invested in democracy
Original Interpretation
It is not just that the proportion of Americans who state that it is “essential” to live in a democracy, which stands at 72 percent among those born before World War II, has fallen to 30 percent among millennials. It is also that, contrary to Ronald Inglehart’s response to our earlier essay in these pages,3 a similar cohort pattern is found across all longstanding democracies, including Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand (see Figure 1). In virtually all cases, the generation gap is striking, with the proportion of younger citizens who believe it is essential to live in a democracy falling to a minority.
Indicator
Importance of democracy
Technique
replication of Fig 1 from 2016-article with more countries
Operationalization
acceptance of scale point 10
Country
Australia, UK, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, US
Our Assessment
see above
Study
The Signs of Deconsolidation, 2017
DOI
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/02_28.1_Foa%20%26%20Mounk%20pp%205-15.pdf
Fig
Fig 2
Title
Global rise in share of citizens wishing for a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections
Original Interpretation
The share of citizens who approve of having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections, for example, has gone up markedly in most of the countries where the World Values Survey asked the question—including such varied places as Germany, the United States, Spain, Turkey, and Russia.
Indicator
Regime Preferences: Strong Leader
Technique
comparions of 1995 and 2010 waves. dichotomized item
Operationalization
dichotomized item
Country
many all across the world
Our Assessment
most countries not in Europe. Within European countries the trends are not clear in Figure 2.
Study
The End of the Consolidation Paradigm, 2017
DOI
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/media/Journal%20of%20Democracy%20Web%20Exchange%20-%20Foa%20and%20Mounk%20reply--2_0.pdf
Fig
Fig 1
Title
Figure from Norris (2017): Approval of Democracy by Age Group, 1995-2011
Original Interpretation
Take the graph presented by Pippa Norris as counter-evidence to our thesis of eroding youth support in the United States: it clearly shows both a) that, at this point in time, young people are more critical of democracy than older people; and b) that young people at this point in time are more critical of democracy than young people had been in the past
Indicator
Regime Preferences: Democracy
Technique
generational analysis
acceptance of age groups in different survey waves
Operationalization
mean value of acceptance
Country
US
Our Assessment
US sample. see above.
Study
The End of the Consolidation Paradigm, 2017
DOI
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/media/Journal%20of%20Democracy%20Web%20Exchange%20-%20Foa%20and%20Mounk%20reply--2_0.pdf
Fig
Fig 2
Title
Respondents Aged 15-24 have become Critical of Democracy at a Faster Rate than People Aged 65+
Original Interpretation
Respondents Aged 15-24 have become Critical of Democracy at a Faster Rate than People Aged 65+
Indicator
Regime Preferences:
Democracy (negative)
Technique
Different in attitude dynamics among young and older individuals
Operationalization
dichotomized
Country
EU
Our Assessment
All analyses are based on extremely small sample sizes but the figure does not show uncertainty of the estimates.
The analysis does not take into account the possibiltiy that acceptance of democracy increases in both age-groups. In such a case (which is a frequent occurance in the data we analyzed) the analyses presented in Figure 2 is somewhat misleading.
Study
The End of the Consolidation Paradigm, 2017
DOI
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/media/Journal%20of%20Democracy%20Web%20Exchange%20-%20Foa%20and%20Mounk%20reply--2_0.pdf
Fig
Fig 3
Title
Support for Democracy among European Youth (16-26) Respondents, 1999-2001 and 2017
Original Interpretation
In three countries (France, Italy, and Poland), only a minority of those aged 16 to 26 view democracy as the best form of government. In the UK, just over half of young respondents take this view. Even in Germany, which has so far shown less strong democratic deconsolidation than other countries, only about three in five respondents believe this
Indicator
Regime Preferences: Democracy (preferential)
Operationalization
one scale point
Country
EU
Our Assessment
EVS 2017 does not contain similar items. (EVS 2017 would enable to conduct a similar analysis by calculating rank-orders of individual regime preferences, comparing intra-individually how individuals evaluates different regime types
